Introduction
China's rise as a trading power has taken the world by storm. Its exports have risen from 18 billion dollars or less than 4 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) in 1980 to more than 760 billion dollars or about 35 percent of its GDP by 2005. Besides the rapid expansion of its trade volume, researchers have noted another feature: China's level of sophistication has been rising steadily. This sophistication can be seen in three aspects, two noted in the literature, and the third presented here, by us. First, as Schott (2006) noted, China's export structure increasingly resembles the collective export structure of the high-income countries in a way that seems unusual given China's endowment and level of development. Second, as Rodrik (2006) observed, the level of GDP per capita associated with countries exporting the same basket of goods as China is much higher than China's actual level of income per capita. Third, as we will show, the fraction of product lines that the United States, the fi fteen-member European Union, and Japan (referred to hereafter as G3) export and that China does not is shrinking steadily. Obviously, these three trends are not independent from 1. This is computed at national level using equation (2) and excluding the region subscript. 2. There is virtually no product that China exports but G3 does not. 3. Xu (2007) noted that for the same product, the unit value of China's exports tends to be lower than that of rich countries, indicating that China's varieties are of lower quality and preeach other. Taken at their face value, they may suggest that China is competing head to head with producers from developed and developing nations alike. This has generated a tremendous amount of anxiety in many nations. Why would China, a country with an extreme abundance of labor but relative scarcity in capital, skilled labor, and research and development (R&D) investment, produce and export a bundle of goods that resembles those of developed countries? Schott (2006) conjectures that this results from a combination of a large variation in factor endowment and a low factor mobility across regions.
The evolution of China's export sophistication during 1996 to 2005 is traced out in table 2.1. This table shows that the level of dissimilarity between China's export structure and that of the G3 economies declined from 133.7 in 1996 to 121.5 by 2005.
1 During the same period, the number of Harmonized System (HS) six-digit product lines exported by G3 countries but not by China fell from 101 in 1996 to 83 in 2005, out of 4,143 and 4,212 in total, respectively. As a share of the product lines that the G3 export, those not manufactured by China fell from 2.44 percent of the total in 1996 to 1.97 percent in 2005. This count is somewhat misleading as China exports a very small volume (i.e., less than $1 million) in several product lines. Excluding these lines, the share of products exported by the G3 but not by China fell from 28.7 percent (1,189/4,143) in 1996 to 13.7 percent (578/4,212) in 2005. 2 How much should developed countries be concerned with rising competitive pressure from increasingly sophisticated Chinese exports? The answer depends on the sources of China's rising sophistication. On the one hand, this sophistication, as measured, could be a statistical mirage due to processing trade. For example, both the United States and China may export notebook computers, but Chinese manufacturers may have to import the computer's most sophisticated components, such as central processing units (CPUs) made by Intel or AMD in the United States. In such a case, Chinese producers may specialize in the unsophisticated stage of production although the fi nal product is classifi ed as sophisticated. If one were able to classify a product further into its components, China and developed countries might be found to produce different components. That is, they do not compete directly with each other. In this scenario, there is very little for the developed countries to worry about.
As a variation of this scenario, China and the high-income economies may export the same set of product lines, but they may export very different varieties within each product line, with China exporting varieties of much lower quality.
3 Competition between the high-income economies and China need not be tense.
On the other hand, the Chinese authorities, including governments at the regional or local levels, have been actively promoting quality upgrades to China's product structure through tax and other policy incentives. A particular manifestation of these incentives is the proliferation of economic and technological development zones, high-tech industrial zones, and export processing zones around the country. Their collective share in China's exports rose from less than 6 percent in 1995 to about 25 percent by 2005. These policy incentives could increase the similarity of Chinese exports to those of developed countries, though they are unlikely to be efficient (unless learning by doing confers a signifi cant positive externality). If policy is the primary driver for rising sophistication (rather than the mismeasurement induced by processing trade), then China may come into more direct competition with developed countries.
Foreign-invested fi rms in China straddle these two explanations. The share of China's total exports produced by wholly foreign-owned fi rms and Sino- Source: Authors' computation based on trade statistics from the China Customs Administration and on G3 data downloaded from the UN COMTRADE database. Note: The export dissimilarity index is computed based on equation (2) (table 2. 2). These foreign-invested fi rms may choose to produce and export much more sophisticated products than would indigenous Chinese fi rms. In this scenario, while China-made products may compete with those from developed countries, the profi ts from such activities contribute directly to the gross national products (GNPs) of developed countries. Besides the direct effect of foreign-invested fi rms on China's export upgrading, the presence of foreign fi rms may help indirectly to raise the sophistication of Chinese exports through various spillovers to domestic fi rms (Hale and Long 2006) . The preceding three possible explanations can reinforce each other rather than be mutually exclusive. For example, a foreign-invested fi rm may engage in processing trade while located in a high-tech zone.
To the best of our knowledge, direct evidence on the importance of these channels is not yet available in the literature until recently. Using a detailed product-level data set on Chinese exports, the chapter by Amiti and Freund (chapter 1 in this volume) examines the change in the skill content of the Chinese exports. They have found a dramatic transformation of the export structure since 1992. In particular, there has been a signifi cant decline in the share of agriculture and traditional labor-intensive manufacturing products, such as textiles, garments, and shoes, with a growing share in nontraditional manufactures, such as consumer electronics, appliances, computers, and telecommunication equipment. This would seem to suggest a dramatic rise in the skill content of China's exports. They confi rm this by measuring the skill content in a sector as the ratio of nonproduction workers to total employment from the Indonesian manufacturing census at the fi ve-digit International Standard Industrial Classifi cation (ISIC) level for 1992 (they don't have access to comparable data for China). However, a prominent feature of the Chinese exports is the role of processing trade-the use of tariff-free imported inputs in the production for exports-accounting for more than half of China's total exports in recent years. It is possible the real skill content in processing exports is low even though they may appear in sectors that otherwise would be classifi ed as having a high-skill content.
Outside processing exports, they fi nd very little skill upgrading associated with normal exports. They note, however, that they cannot rule out the possibility that within processing exports, "the Chinese value added has become more skill-intensive."
In this chapter, we measure China's evolving export sophistication, not by the changing share of nonproduction workers in employment, but, following Schott (2006) , by an increase in the resemblance of its export bundle to those of high-income countries. Our data set is even more fi nely disaggregated than what is used in Amiti and Freund (chapter 1 in this volume): our product-level data set on Chinese exports is disaggregated by fi rm ownership type and incentive status of a production location in about 240 Chinese cities.
Our data set allows us to examine some questions that are not possible to examine in the previous chapter. For example, we can assess respective contributions by processing exports in a high-tech incentive zone, normal exports in a similar zone, and processing exports outside the incentive zones to China's export structure sophistication. This allows us to also reach somewhat different conclusions.
To preview some of our key fi ndings, we will argue that it is important to look both at export structure and at the unit value of exports. We will report evidence that neither processing trade nor foreign-invested fi rms play an important role in generating the increased overlap between China's export structure and that of the high-income countries. Instead, improvement in human capital and government policies in the form of tax-favored hightech zones appear to contribute signifi cantly to the rising sophistication of China's exports.
Our fi nding on the role of processing trade in raising export sophistication appears to be different from the previous chapter in part due to the difference in the data sets (and in part due to the difference in the metric used to assess sophistication). Our more fi nely disaggregated data shows that the contributions to export structure sophistication from processing and normal exports in a high-tech incentive zone are about the same, and those from processing and normal exports outside any incentive zones are also about the same. This leads us to conclude that it is the incentive zones, not processing trade, that are associated with a more sophisticated export structure. Because processing exports are disproportionately located in vari-ous incentive zones, one may not be able to isolate the effect of processing exports without the more disaggregated data.
An analysis of unit values adds important insights. Processing trade is positively associated with higher unit values. In the absence of data on value added from imported inputs versus domestic inputs, it is difficult to say whether processing trade has generated any skill upgrading for China. However, after controlling for processing trade, exports by foreign-invested fi rms tend to have systematically higher unit values, suggesting that they produce higher-end product varieties (beyond promoting processing exports). Hightech zones and other policy zones set up by the government are likewise associated with higher unit values (beyond promoting processing trade). Therefore, both foreign investment and government policy zones are conducive to greater product sophistication, by increasing the overlap in China's export structure with that of the advanced economies or by producing higher-end varieties within a given product category.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 explains the basic specifi cation and the underlying data, section 2.3 reports a series of statistical analyses, and section 2.4 concludes.
Specifi cation and Data
Our strategy is to make use of variations across Chinese cities in both export sophistication and its potential determinants to study their relationship. We look at two measures of export sophistication: (a) the similarity between local export structure to that of the G3 economies, and (b) the unit value of local exports. We consider several categories of determinants, including the level of human capital, the use of processing trade, and the promotion of sophistication by governments through high-tech and economic development zones.
Data and Basic Facts
Data on China's exports were obtained from the China Customs General Administration at the HS eight-digit level (the most disaggregated level of classifi cation available). The administration's database reports the geographic origin of exports (from more than 400 cities in China), policy zone designation (i.e., whether an exporter is located in any type of policy zone), fi rm ownership, and transaction type (whether an export is related to processing trade, as determined by customs declarations) for the period from 1995 through 2005.
We link this database with a separate database on Chinese cities, including gross metropolitan product (GMP) per capita, population, college enrolment, and foreign direct investment (FDI) data, downloaded from China Data Online (a site managed by the University of Michigan China Data Center). Unfortunately, the coverage of this second database is more limited (240 cities from 1996 through 2004), which effectively constrains the ultimate sample for the statistical analyses. Our sample of cities is listed in Table 2 .3 reports a breakdown of China's exports into processing trade, normal trade, and other categories according to exporters' customs declarations. Processing exports come from three areas: (a) export processing zones, (b) various high-tech zones, and (c) areas outside any policy zones. Collectively, their share of the country's total exports increased from 43 percent (ϭ 0 ϩ 3.2% ϩ 39.8%) in 1995 to 52 percent (ϭ 4.6% ϩ 11.8% ϩ 35.6%) in 2005. As we lack information on the share of processing exports for other countries, we cannot conduct a formal international comparison. Our conjecture is that few developing countries would have a share of processing 4. Fisman and Wei (2004) provide evidence of massive tariff evasion on China's imports. Fisman, Moustakerski, and Wei (2008) suggest that entrepôt trade via Hong Kong may have been used as a conduit for part of the tariff evasion.
exports as large as China's. On the other hand, we conjecture that China's reported processing trade may be exaggerated due to some fi rms' desire to evade tariffs on the domestic sale of imported "inputs." 4 Table 2 .4 tabulates the distribution of fi rm ownership for exports from each type of policy zone. Foreign-invested fi rms are dominant in processing exports, accounting for 100 percent of exports out of export processing zones, 95 percent of processing exports out of high-tech zones, and 67 percent of processing exports from the rest of China. State-owned fi rms account for the bulk of the remaining processing trade. Therefore, wholly and partly foreign-owned fi rms handle most processing exports. The reverse is not true-foreign fi rms also engage in normal (i.e., nonprocessing) exports, accounting in 2004 for 40 percent of nonprocessing exports out of high-tech zones and for 24 percent of normal trade outside policy zones.
We can compute a breakdown of export type (processing or nonprocessing) by ownership. The result is reported in table 2.6. For both wholly foreign-owned fi rms and Sino-foreign joint ventures, processing trade accounts for nearly 50 percent of exports. For state-owned fi rms and collectively owned fi rms, the share of processing exports in their total exports is 18 percent and 13 percent, respectively. Domestic private fi rms engage in comparatively little processing trade, making less than 7 percent of their exports in this category.
As part of its development strategy, China established a number of special economic zones and other areas where special incentives were applied following 1979. Five special economic zones (SEZs) were set up and should be distinguished from other special economic areas. These include all of Hainan province, three cities in Guangdong province (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou), and a city in Fujian Province (Xiamen). Other special eco- Note: GMP ϭ gross metropolitan product. nomic areas are much smaller geographically and are classifi ed as economic and technological development areas (ETDAs), hi-technology industry development areas (HTIDA), and export processing zones (EPZs). Some of these special incentive zones and areas are located within the fi ve SEZs. We will also refer to these incentive zones or areas as "policy zones." The ETDAs and HTIDAs are tax-favored enclaves established by central or local governments (with approval by the central government) to promote development of sectors designated as "high and new tech," albeit by somewhat poorly defi ned criteria. In theory, there are differences between the two types of zones. In practice, however, the line between the two is often blurred. On simple average (across cities and years), only 0.04 percent of exports come from EPZs. This means that most of China's processing exports are produced outside EPZs. It is useful to bear this in mind when interpreting the regression coefficients in the subsequent tables.
Foreign-invested fi rms dominate processing exports from EPZs and high-tech zones (in our sample period, 99 percent and 95 percent respectively-see table 2.4) and also took a lion's share of processing trade (67 percent) outside those policy zones. State-owned fi rms are the major players in normal exports, accounting for 58 percent of normal exports from high-tech zones and 63 percent of normal exports outside policy zones, during our sample period. Though they played a small role in processing trade, collectively owned and private fi rms produced an important share of China's normal exports, accounting for 8.5 percent of normal exports from high-tech zones and 18 percent of exports outside policy zones (table 2.4).
Basic Specifi cation
We relate the sophistication level of local export structure to its plausible determinants, including the role of processing trade, foreign investment, and local human capital. Formally, the econometric specifi cation is given by the following equation (or by variations to be noted):
where Ln(EDI) is the log of a dissimilarity index between a Chinese city's export structure and the combined export structure of the United States, Japan, and the European Union. ␤ 1 ␤ 2 , . . . , ␤ 6 are coefficients to be estimated. rft is the error term. Other regressors and the sources of our data are explained in table 2A.1. Robust standard errors, clustered by city, are reported.
We defi ne an index for a lack of sophistication by the dissimilarity between the product structure of a region's exports and that of the G3 economies, or the export dissimilarity index (EDI), as:
where
where s irft is the share of HS product i at six-digit level in Chinese city r's exports for fi rm type f in year t, and s i,t ref is the share of HS product i in the six-digit level exports of G3 developed countries. The greater the value of the index, the more dissimilar the compared export structures are. If the two export structures were identical, then the value of the index would be zero; if the two export structures were to have no overlap, then the index would take the value of 200. We regard an export structure as more sophisticated if the index takes a smaller value. Alternatively, one could use the similarity index proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979) and used by Schott (2006) (except for the scale):
This index is bounded by zero and 100. If Chinese city r's export structure had no overlap with that of the G3 developed countries, then the export similarity index (ESI) would be zero; if the two export structures had a perfect overlap, then the index would take the value of 100. It can be verifi ed that there is a one-to-one, linear mapping between ESI and EDI: Table 2A .7 reports regressions that use ESI and EDI in levels, respectively, as the dependent variables. It can be seen that the coefficient on any given regressor always has the opposite sign in each of the two specifi cations. These linear specifi cations have the drawback that the error term is far from being normally distributed. A better specifi cation would use logged EDI or logged ESI as the dependent variable. However, log(ESI) is related to log(EDI) only nonlinearly. Economic theory does not give much guidance to the exact functional form. Our experimentation suggests that using log(EDI) as the dependent variable is more likely to produce robustly signifi cant coefficients. Most important, the sign patterns on the coefficient estimates are consistent between regressions using logged EDI and EDI, respectively, as the dependent variables, but they are inconsistent between regressions using logged ESI and ESI as the left-hand-side variables. Therefore, in our analysis, we use log(EDI) as the dependent variable.
Analysis

Basic Results
Our regression results are reported in table 2.7. In the fi rst four columns, the sophistication of a city's export structure is measured on a year-byyear basis by its similarity with that of the G3 high-income countries. As a robustness check, in the last four columns, export sophistication is measured against the export structure of the high-income countries in a fi xed year (2004, the last in our sample period). The change in reference year for export sophistication does not turn out to matter qualitatively.
The coefficient on "export processing zone exports as a share of total city exports" is negative and signifi cant, implying that exports from EPZs tend to be more similar to those of the G3 high-income countries than are typical Chinese exports. However, as a majority of Chinese cities do not have EPZs, this does not contribute much to explaining cross-city differences in export sophistication.
The coefficients on the two variables describing exports from high-tech zones ("processing exports from high-tech zones" and "nonprocessing exports from high-tech zones") are negative and signifi cant, implying that the high-tech zones do contribute to raising the sophistication of the Chinese export structure. Comparing the two point estimates, however, one sees that the nonprocessing exports from the two types of high-tech zones in fact contribute more to raising export sophistication than do processing exports.
The coefficient on processing exports outside any policy zones is positive and signifi cant: the more processing trade outside any policy zones, the less sophisticated a city's exports are. Taking the discussion of the last four coefficients together, we argue that processing trade (outside policy zones) is unlikely to have promoted the resemblance of the Chinese export structure to that of the high-income countries. This argument is consistent with the intuition that processing trade in many areas of China, excepting policy zones, is relatively labor-intensive. The coefficient on student enrollment in colleges or graduate schools as a share of a given city's nonagricultural population-a proxy for that city's level of human capital-is negative and signifi cant, consistent with the notion that a city with more skilled labor tends to have a more sophisticated export structure. In column (2) of table 2.7, we use GMP per capita as an alternative measure of a city's level of human capital. This variable also produces a negative coefficient, indicating an association between more human capital and more sophisticated export structure.
In columns (3) to (4) of table 2.7, we include measures of the presence of foreign fi rms in a city. The estimated coefficient for exports by wholly foreign-owned fi rms as a share of a city's total exports is not signifi cantly different from zero. Interestingly, the share of exports by joint-venture fi rms has a positive coefficient: the more a city's exports come from joint-venture fi rms, the less that city's export structure resembles that of the high-income countries. These results suggest that foreign-invested fi rms in China are not directly responsible for the rising sophistication of China's export structure, or at least not in a simple linear fashion.
As we explained earlier, columns (5) to (8) of table 2.7 replicate the fi rst four columns except that the left-hand-side variables are recalibrated against the export structure of the G3 economies in 2004. The qualitative results remain essentially the same. To summarize the key fi ndings that emerge from the series of regressions in table 2.7, we fi nd the following:
1. Cross-city differences in human capital are linked to cross-city differences in the level of sophistication of export structures. A higher level of human capital, measured either by GMP per capita or by college and graduate school enrollment, is associated with a more sophisticated export structure.
2. High-tech zones are associated with more sophisticated export structures. The higher the share of a city's exports produced in high-tech zones, the more likely that city's export structure is to resemble that of the G3 high-income economies.
3. The EPZs contribute to rising sophistication in export structures. However, because only a small fraction of Chinese cities have EPZs, these play a very small quantitative role in explaining cross-city differences in export-structure sophistication.
4. Processing trade is not generally a major factor in explaining crosscity differences in export-structure sophistication. This can be seen in two ways. First, with regard to exports outside policy zones (which represent the lion's share of all exports), more processing trade is in fact associated with less resemblance to the export structure of the high-income countries. Second, with regard to exports produced in high-tech zones, nonprocessing trade is more responsible for a resemblance to the export structure of the high-income countries than processing trade.
5. After controlling for exports from major policy zones, foreign investment appears not to play a major role in explaining cross-city differences in the level of sophistication of their export structures. If anything, jointventure fi rms may create some divergence between a city's export structure and that of the high-income economies.
These fi ndings reject the view that China's increasingly sophisticated export structure is the product of processing trade or foreign-invested fi rms. Meanwhile, these fi ndings confi rm the importance of human capital and government-sponsored high-tech zones in increasing the sophistication of China's export structure.
The specifi cation used in table 2.7 includes city fi xed effects, as is expected in panel regressions such as ours. However, to ensure that the variables we have proposed-processing trade, foreign ownership, high-tech zones, human capital, and so on-collectively have sufficient explanatory power over observed cross-city export-structure dissimilarities, we have run similar regressions without city fi xed effects (see table 2A.8). The signs on the coefficient estimates and their statistical signifi cance are generally similar in table 2A.8 and in table 2.7. Equally important, the values of R-square in this second set of regressions lie in the range of 66 to 68 percent. This suggests that much of the cross-city differences in export patterns are explained by the included regressors and not by city fi xed effects.
Exports by Firms of Different Ownership
Because China is still transitioning from a centrally planned system to a market-based economy and has become very open to foreign direct investment (as the greatest developing-country recipient of FDI since 1995), its exports are primarily generated by state-owned fi rms and foreign-invested fi rms rather than by domestic privately owned fi rms. State-owned and foreign-invested fi rms account for 40 percent and 51 percent of China's total exports during our sample period, respectively (table 2.2). It will be benefi cial to examine the determinants of export-structure sophistication by fi rm ownership type. Table 2 .8 reports a series of regressions with the left-hand-side variable being the export-structure dissimilarity index for state-owned fi rms (but otherwise identically specifi ed as those in table 2.7). The results shown in table 2.8 are qualitatively very similar to those in table 2.7. In particular, differences in the degree of processing trade (outside policy zones) are not shown to be responsible for cross-city differences in export-structure sophistication. If anything, processing trade outside policy zones may have reduced the resemblance of Chinese export structures to those of high-income coun- 5. Hale and Long (2006) suggest that foreign fi rms in China generate technological spillover to local fi rms in part through the reemployment of skilled labor from foreign-invested fi rms by local fi rms.
tries. More human capital, as measured by either GMP per capita or college student enrollment, is associated with an increased resemblance of stateowned-enterprise export structures to that of the high-income countries.
Columns (3) to (4) and (7) to (8) of table 2.8 can be interpreted as a test of possible spillover from foreign-invested fi rms to local state-owned enterprises in any given city. 5 The coefficients on the shares of wholly foreignowned fi rms or joint ventures in a city's total exports are essentially zero, statistically. Therefore, the presence by foreign fi rms in the same industry and in the same city does not appear to affect whether state-owned-enterprise exports resemble those of the high-income countries. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 report similar regressions for wholly foreign-owned and Sino-foreign joint-venture fi rms, respectively. In these tables, unlike in tables 2.7 and 2.8, no regressor except the proxies for human capital is statistically signifi cant. This reinforces our earlier conclusion that, during our sample period, foreign-invested fi rms did not contribute to the rising sophistication of China's export structure. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 suggest that this is true whether foreign fi rms are located in EPZs, high-tech zones, or elsewhere. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from examining whether FDI from different source countries has differentially promoted the sophistication of China's export structure. For completeness, we also examine the dissimilarity index of export structures relative to the G3 economies for collectively and privately owned fi rms, respectively (see tables 2.11 and 2.12). For each type of fi rm, a higher level of local human capital is associated with the greater resemblance of its exports to those of the high-income countries. For collectively owned fi rms alone, there is evidence that processing trade both within and without policy zones may have slowed the rise in the sophistication of these fi rms' export structures. This is consistent with the possibility that most of these collectively owned fi rms operate in labor-intensive industries.
For domestic private fi rms (but not for collectively owned fi rms), EPZs promote a similar export structure to that of the rich countries. However, EPZs do not exist in most cities. In contrast to the state-owned enterprises, wholly foreign-owned fi rms or joint ventures in the same city have some impact on private fi rms' export-structure sophistication; both coefficients are negative (the coefficient for wholly foreign-owned fi rms is statistically signifi cant). This is evidence that the presence of foreign-invested fi rms may have helped Chinese private fi rms increase their export sophistication over the sample period.
Unit Value
Recent literature emphasizes the importance of specialization across varieties within a product (Schott 2004) ; we now look at cross-city differences in the unit value of the same product, where a product is defi ned both by its HS eight-digit code and by its physical unit code. For example, HS 94053000 refers to "lighting sets used for Christmas trees," but there are two different physical units used to measure the quantities of exports of this product: number of items and mass in kilograms. We take 94053000 (number of items) and 94503000 (kilograms) as two different products in our estimation.
Our assumption is that different unit values for the same product refl ect different varieties (and statistical noise). For example, both high-end and low-end digital cameras fi t into the same HS eight-digit product classifi cation, but high-end cameras command a higher unit value. We note, however, that differences in unit value within an eight-digit product category may also refl ect factors other than quality, such as differences in production costs (see Hallack 2006; Hallack and Schott 2006 ). We will assume that these factors generate noise in the mapping of unit value against product variety.
We now investigate the roles of processing trade, high-tech zones, and fi rm ownership in explaining differences in unit value (which proxy for differences in variety) within a product category. To fi x intuition, let us look at two examples. As a fi rst example, color video monitors (HS code 852821) were produced and exported in 2005 by local and foreign-invested fi rms located in EPZs and high-tech zones and also outside policy zones. The average unit value of monitors produced by foreign-invested fi rms was $241.50. 
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7. This fi gure is taken from information in the UN COMTRADE database; we thank Mark Gehlhar for providing this data.
Even monitors produced entirely by foreign-invested fi rms in China showed variations in unit value dependent on where the producer was located and whether the export was of processing trade or normal trade. The unit value of monitors exported from an EPZ was $347.80; processing-export monitors from a high-tech zone were valued at $456.70, while normal-export monitors from the same zone were sold for $364.80; in distinction, processing-export monitors from outside any policy zone were valued at only $56.80, and normal-trade monitors from outside any policy zone cost $73.60. Ownership also matters. The unit value of a monitor was $207.00 when it was exported by a state-owned fi rm and only $77.20 when it was exported by a domestic private fi rm. For comparison, the average unit value of the same product, as exported by producers from the United States, the European Union, and Japan was $467.40.
7 Generally speaking, the unit values of the Chinese exports are lower than those from high-income countries. In this example, of the Chinese varieties, the processing-export monitor produced by a foreign fi rm located in a high-tech zone had the highest unit value, roughly 98 percent of the value of G3 exports, suggesting that it may substitute closely for the high-income countries' variety.
As a second example, video cameras (HS code 852540) were also produced and exported by fi rms of various ownership, located in areas with different policy incentives. The average unit value for video cameras exported by foreign-invested fi rms was $51.50 in 2005, compared to $30.20 for a similar camera made by state-owned fi rms. Both export type and fi rm location matter as well. Of processing-exports cameras produced by foreign-invested fi rms, the unit value was $154.60 for exports from a high-tech zone, $66.30 for those from outside any policy zone, and $51.50 for those assembled in an export processing zone. For normal-export cameras made by a foreign fi rm, the unit value was $21.60 for those from a high-tech zone, and only $13.20 for those from outside any policy zone. Again, processing exports from a high-tech zone had the highest unit value, and normal exports not from any policy zone had the lowest value. Cameras produced by foreign-invested fi rms generally had a higher unit value than did local fi rms. For comparison, the average unit value of a camera manufactured in the G3 countries (the United States, Japan, and the European Union) was $331.50. In this example, even China's priciest variety (a processing export made in a high-tech zone by a foreign fi rm) had a unit value only 47 percent that of the average G3-exported camera. In this example, the variety of video camera made in China is unlikely to substitute closely for that of a wealthy country.
While these examples are illustrative, we must turn to a regression framework to summarize patterns in the data more efficiently and systematically. Additionally, our regression framework explicitly accounts for differences in income across regions, as well as other factors that could account for the differences in unit value. Let ln(Unit_Value rkt ) denote the natural logarithm of the unit value of city r's export of product k in year t. Our specifi cation relates this variable to city by year fi xed effects, product fi xed effects, the share of export processing zones in a city's export of a given product, the share of high-tech zones in that city's export of that product (distinguished in regressions between processing and nonprocessing exports), the share of processing trade in that city's export of that product from outside any policy zones, and other control variables. Note that city by year fi xed effects are more general than either year fi xed effects or city fi xed effects. Our regression results are reported in table 2.13. Column (1) shows that both export processing zones and high-tech zones are associated with higher unit values. Of the exports originated from the high-tech zones, those produced by processing trade are linked to higher unit values than those of nonprocessing trade. An increase of 10 percent in processing exports from a high-tech zone as a share of a city's total exports is associated with an increase of 5.9 percent in unit value, whereas an increase of the same magnitude in the share of nonprocessing trade from high-tech zones is associated with a 2.1 percent increase in unit value. An increase of 10 percent in the export share of EPZs in a city's total exports is associated with an increase of 2.1 percent in unit value. With regard to unit value, there is no difference between exports from an export processing zone and nonprocessing exports from a high-tech zone. In comparison, an increase of 10 percent in the share of processing exports originating outside any policy zone is associated with a 1.2 percent increase in unit value. Overall, processing trade appears to be associated with higher-quality varieties than ordinary trade.
To show the role of foreign investment in upgrading the quality of products, column (2) of table 2.13 includes the respective shares of wholly foreign-owned and joint-venture fi rms in a city's total exports (by HS eightdigit code) as additional regressors. Both new regressors have positive and statistically signifi cant coefficients. An increase of 10 percent in the share of exports made by these two types of fi rms in a city's total exports of a product tends to be associated with an increase in the unit value of the given product by 2.0 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively. This suggests that products from foreign-invested fi rms-assigned higher values-are generally of higher quality.
Interestingly, this adjustment renders the share of EPZs statistically insignifi cant. The coefficients on the shares of processing and ordinary trade out of high-tech zones, and on the share of processing trade outside policy zones, while still positive and statistically signifi cant, are now smaller in magnitude (by more than 2 standard deviations, in two out of the three cases). This suggests that part of the higher-unit value effect, previously attributed to processing trade and high-tech zones, is in fact due to the presence of foreign-invested fi rms in these activities. As noted in the preceding (table 2.4), during the sample period more than 95 percent of exports originating from EPZs and from processing trade in high-tech zones were produced by foreign-invested fi rms. Column (3) of table 2.13 includes a regressor of the combined share of collective and private fi rms in a city's total exports and one of the share of state-owned fi rms (this column excludes that of shares held by foreigninvested fi rms). Column (4) of table 2.13 includes the two types of foreigninvested fi rms plus the combined share of the collective and domestic private fi rms (leaving out that of state-owned fi rms). The shares of exports made by collective and domestic private fi rms, and by state-owned fi rms, have negative and statistically signifi cant coefficients, indicating that a larger share of Chinese domestic fi rms in a city's exports is associated with a lower unit value of those exports. This confi rms the intuition that, in a given HS eightdigit product line, foreign-invested fi rms in China produce relatively higherquality varieties than do Chinese domestic fi rms.
Taking these unit value results together, we conclude that processing trade (regardless of its origin), high-tech zones, and foreign invested fi rms are all independently associated with higher unit values, suggesting that they have each individually played a role in leading China to produce and export higher-quality products than it otherwise would have.
Conclusion
Are China's exports competing head to head with those of high-income countries? This paper addresses this question by examining variations in export sophistication across different cities in China. It looks at both the overlap in product structure between a city's exports and those of the advanced economies and at the unit values of different products.
Estimation shows that China's export structure as a whole has begun increasingly to resemble that of the G3 advanced economies, and the unit values of its exports are also rising over time. If these patterns are generated entirely by the rise of processing trade, then there may not be much genuine increase in the sophistication of Chinese exports. If there has been increase in sophistication, but one brought about solely by foreign investment in China, then the economic profi t associated with improved sophistication has accrued to foreign economies rather than to China's. Of course, increased sophistication can also come from a higher level of local human capital or from government policies set up expressly to promote the upgrading of industrial infrastructure, such as government initiatives establishing hightech policy zones. Regional variations in the use of processing trade and high-tech zones and the availability of skilled labor are assessed in this paper to determine the relative importance of these factors. Econometric analysis conducted in this study helps to clarify this issue.
8. The higher unit values associated with processing exports may simply refl ect the higher cost of using imported inputs rather than domestically made inputs. This leaves open the question of whether processing exports generate more value added than do normal exports that use more local or domestic inputs.
capital is associated with more sophisticated export structures in Chinese cities.
2. High-tech zones are associated both with more sophisticated export structures and with higher unit values. This indicates that the policy zones (especially ETDZs and HTIDZs) set up by central and local governments may have worked to induce fi rms to upgrade their product ladder to a higher level than they would have otherwise done. In other words, these policy zones not only promoted processing trade, but they also promoted improvements in the sophistication of China's exports.
3. The EPZs contribute both to the rising sophistication of China's export structure and to the rising unit values of its exports. However, because only a tiny fraction of Chinese cities have EPZs and because most of their exports come from foreign-invested fi rms, EPZs do not contribute greatly to explaining cross-city differences in export sophistication.
4. Processing trade is not generally a major factor in explaining the crosscity differences in export-structure sophistication. This can be seen in two ways. First, with regard to exports originating outside policy zones (which took up the lion's share of China's total exports during our sample period, about 42 percent), more processing trade is in fact associated with a lesser resemblance to the export structure of advanced countries. Second, with regard to exports originating inside of the high-tech zones, products associated with the processing trade do not appear to overlap more with advanced countries' exports than do those associated with nonprocessing trade.
However, processing trade is signifi cantly associated with higher unit values. How can our fi ndings on export structure and unit values be reconciled? If processing-export production outside the policy zones is generally labor-intensive, a higher share in a given city will increase the dissimilarity of that city's export structure to that of the G3 advanced economies. However, processing exports could still be of higher quality (of greater sophistication) than normal trade exports in the same product line if higher-quality materials are used to manufacture the former. In other words, processing trade moves China into the production and export of more sophisticated varieties within a given product category, but not necessarily within those product categories heavily exported by the G3 advanced economies. 8 5. The export share of foreign-invested fi rms in a Chinese city does not appear to play a major role in explaining cross-city differences in the sophistication level of export structures. If anything, joint-venture fi rms may create some divergence between a city's export structure and that of the advanced economies. However, after controlling for processing trade, both types of foreign-invested fi rms are found to be strongly associated with higher export unit values. Therefore, foreign investment has been conducive to greater same-product sophistication in China. Notes: GMP ϭ gross metropolitan product; FIE ϭ foreign-invested enterprises. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Export dissimilarity index and export similarity index in levels as dependent variables. * * * Signifi cant at the 1 percent level. * * Signifi cant at the 5 percent level. 
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